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A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to propose new structural and political 
solutions which would help in redeploying the United States bases from 
Germany into other European countries. This decision seems to be necessary 
in the new political environment in Europe. New American base structure in 
Europe should be more efficient, more agile and less expensive than the 
present one. This thesis examines the main considerations that should guide 
the United States Department of Defense in the decision to restructure the 
present base structure in Germany. 
This topic is important for three reasons. First, American forces in 
Germany are not positioned to meet the coming challenges of the 21st 
century. With the increasing need for operability outside Europe, bases in the 
heart of unified Germany no longer serve the strategic purpose they did 
during the Cold War. Second, present American basing structure in Germany 
is expensive and too large. Instead of spending precious resources on military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
still maintains a complex base structure in Germany with thousands of U.S. 
soldiers and their families. Third, in the new political environment in Europe, 
the United States faces serious impediments and difficulties from the German 
government in realizing the fundamental aims of American foreign policy. 
Contradictory to the German point of view, Central European countries firmly 
supporting U.S. policy and would like to host American soldiers. 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
This thesis investigates the causes for redeploying and realigning 
present U.S. military structure in Germany. In addition, this thesis considers 
the possibility that redeploying American forces from Germany into other 
European countries may be the first necessary adjustment of the U.S. military 
in the 21st century. To accomplish this task-that is, gaining a better 
understanding of the controversy associated with realignment of the U.S. 
base structure in Germany-four fundamental questions need to be addressed. 
First, how has the post-Cold War evolution of Europe affected U.S. 
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perceptions of Germany and its importance to the United States? Second, 
what are the reasons for realignment of the present U.S. military presence in 
Germany? Third, what will be the future of American bases in Germany and 
how will future U.S. bases in Europe look? Lastly, and most importantly, when 
will this process begin?  
To respond to these questions a few major arguments are necessary. 
After the end of the Cold War, the present American base structure in 
Germany is no longer efficient. This military configuration was developed to 
defend against a largely static and predictable enemy-the Soviet Union-during 
the Cold War era.  
In present times, in the shadow of the war on terrorism, the threat 
environment is dispersed and irregular. The necessity to maintain the large 
military structure far away from the United States with the housing, schools, 
and commissaries is difficult and expensive. 
In fact, the DoD still has to invest billions of dollars in new facilities in 
Germany where it already has a presence. The post-Cold War evolution of 
Europe, expanding of NATO and European Union changed the American 
perception of Germany and transferred U.S. interest into other regions of 
Europe.  
From the political point of view, American foreign policy is often 
considered as aggressive and competitive by Western European countries 
like France and Germany. However, Eastern Europe views United States 
policy differently. Eastern European countries see American political, 
economic, and military engagement in Europe as essential for their long-term 
stability. Therefore, many countries from Eastern Europe are already 
interested in hosting U.S. troops in their territory. 
According to DoD speculations, future American bases in Europe will 
look differently. The most probable scenario considers much smaller bases in 
the Eastern part of Europe, closer to potential threats and regions with 
possible ethnic problems.  
The process of redeploying the present U.S. military structure from 
Germany is closely connected with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process. The highest U.S. authorities have realized that the decision 
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is inevitable and is closely linked with the last political events in Europe and 
American National Security Strategy. The final decision in this matter is a part 
of the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The size of the U.S. Armed Forces in Germany has declined sharply 
from the height of the Cold War, when hundreds of thousands of American 
soldiers were stationed in what was then the potential battlefield between the 
West and East. Today, in unified Germany, there is still a significant number 
of American soldiers and family members. Including the family housing areas, 
commissaries, schools and other support facilities, the U.S. Department of 
Defense serves as landlord to thousands of buildings and installations across 
the German territory. 
However, with the increasing need for operability outside Europe, 
Berlin is no longer the front-line for future military conflict. America’s European 
basing structure should reflect this reality. Future conflicts are likely to revolve 
around the Middle East, the Caucasus, and North Africa. In Europe, the 
Balkans and post-Soviet republics with quasi-democracy still could be 
considered as politically unstable and unpredictable areas. Establishing 
forward positions in closer geographical proximity to those regions would 
demonstrate America’s commitment to the long-term security of the region. It 
would also allow the American Armed Forces to respond rapidly to crises in 
those regions. 
For the United States, the preservation of the current base structure in 
Germany for operational, strategic, economical and political reasons is 
becoming more and more difficult. Training has become more difficult in 
Germany due to rigorous environmental regulations. American bases in the 
heart of Europe, together with thousands of U.S. soldiers, family members, 
buildings, installations and other facilities, are too extensive and relatively 
inefficient. As events from September 11 proved, the strong though regular 
and permanent base structure in Europe was helpless when the state was 
confronted with the terrorist threat.  
Moreover, the war in Iraq revealed serious political shifts and 
disturbances within German-American relations. When the Cold War threat 
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was no longer an issue, the cooperation between two countries was quickly 
replaced by political competition in the international arena. German opposition 
towards an American-led war in Iraq could be the best example of different 
approaches in the area of international security.  
In Eastern Europe the situation is different. The further East one travels 
in Europe, the more pro-American the governments become. After being 
oppressed by Nazism and communism, Eastern Europeans recall American 
efforts for those on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. The strong political 
support towards U.S. policy in Iraq is the best example of reliability and 
present strategy of many East European countries. Many states from this part 
of Europe have already started to make great endeavors towards hosting U.S. 
troops in future.  
Some have argued that moving bases eastward would be prohibitively 
expensive. However, the United States already maintains an extensive base 
network in Germany. While there are costs involved, by establishing smaller 
bases set up for rotational forces in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would not incur 
the same sort of costs that it takes to build bases for soldiers and their 
dependents in more expensive parts of the world. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes the historical background of U.S. military presence 
in Germany since 1945 and the current American policy concerning the base 
structure in Germany according to the Base Realignment and Closure 
Process (BRAC). This thesis is primarily based on official American, German 
and European Union sources, including government publications, journals, 
reports and documents related to the national security and BRAC process. 
The realignment of the U.S. base structure is considered as the current topic 
and final decisions are expecting soon. Therefore, this thesis is also based on 
Internet articles from the German and American governments and DoD 
websites. The secondary sources include scholarly analyses, press articles, 
interviews and speeches. 
This thesis is limited to certain aspects and areas of the BRAC 
process.  The  legal  and  institutional  questions are reduced to the necessary  
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minimum; and a number of particular problems, which have important political 
implications, have not been accounted for or have only been mentioned briefly 
in this thesis.  
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the historical 
background of the U.S. military presence in Germany since 1945. This 
includes the development of American position towards Germany according to 
its national interests and security issues both during and after the Cold War. 
This chapter also explains the evolution of U.S. military structure in Germany 
from occupational forces towards the ally forces within the NATO pact. Finally, 
this chapter characterizes the assessment of American-German bilateral 
relations and the new challenges for U.S. bases in other parts of Europe. 
Chapter III provides an analysis of the most important principles for 
transformation of the present U.S. base structure in Germany. This chapter 
includes political, strategic, operational and economic considerations 
important for the final decision concerning redeploying American forces from 
Germany. Chapter IV offers an analysis of predictable decisions concerning 
U.S. bases in Germany according to the next round of the BRAC process and 
estimates the impact of American withdrawal to the German society. This 
chapter also describes the future model of American bases in Europe, better 
adapted towards new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The final 
chapter offers recommendations for the future and provides a summary of the 
key findings. It analyzes the prospects for the U.S. military presence in 
Europe according to the new political situation in the world. 
F. OUTLINE 
Chapter I: Introduction 
A. Statement of purpose 
B. Major questions and arguments 
C. Background 
D. Methodology and sources 
E. Chapter-by-chapter summary 
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Chapter II: U.S. military bases in Germany and the new political 
landscape in Europe 
A. U.S. military structure in Germany: from Occupation to 
Cooperation 
B. U.S. bases in Germany according to American interests in 
Europe 
C. The war in Iraq and the crisis within U.S.-German relations 
D. Challenges for U.S. military presence in Germany 
Chapter III: The most important principles for transformation of 
present U.S. base structure in Germany 
A. Political concerns 
B. Strategic factors 
C. Operational priorities 
D. Economic considerations 
Chapter IV: Restructuring the U.S. military bases in Germany 
A. U.S. bases in Germany and Base Realignment and Closure 
process 
B. The impact of an American withdrawal on the German society 
C. The future model of U.S. military bases in Europe 
Chapter V: Conclusions 
A. Implications for the future 
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II. U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GERMANY AND THE NEW 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE 
A. U.S. MILITARY STRUCTURE IN GERMANY: FROM OCCUPATION 
TO COOPERATION 
After the final defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the triumphant 
Allied Forces divided Germany into four military sectors, each of them 
administered by one of the main allied partners-the United States, England, 
France, and the Soviet Union.1 The U.S. forces took control of the Southern 
and Central-Western part of Germany, today’s federal states of Bavaria, 
Baden-Würtemberg and Hesse.2 The strictly enforced Western occupation 
zones would not last long. However, they continued to dominate the base 
structure and positioning of the Allied Forces throughout the Cold War and 
almost to present day. 
Growing tension between the Soviet Union and the other Allied Forces 
quickly dominated post-war policies in Germany. Fear of assault on both sides 
of the Cold War border helped in the evolution of the role of foreign forces in 
Germany from one of occupation to one of protection. To guard against the 
possible ultimate threat, the United States continued to maintain a large 
military presence in subordinated zones long after the situation in Germany 
was secured. 
In 1947 and 1948, the battle over the fate of postwar Europe was 
becoming more worrying.3 With America’s announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine, the introduction of the Marshall Plan, and impending merger of the 
Western zones of Germany into a single republic, Berlin became the flash 
point of the Cold War.4  
 As relations hardened between the Cold War adversaries, Germany 
became the primary potential battlefield for World War III and U.S. troop levels 
 
1 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, Scope, Impacts, and Opportunities,” Bonn International Center for Conversion, 
report 4 (June 1995), 10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Richard Pells, Not Like Us, How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed 
American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 47. 
4 Ibid. 
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tripled from 1950 to 1953.5 Every year for nearly four decades, one-quarter of 
a million troops were stationed in West Germany until 1993, when the number 
of U.S. soldiers dropped to 105,254.6  
In 1949, with the support of the Western Allies, a new West German 
government was created.7 West German government lacked the necessary 
independence to negotiate with the Allied commanders, and was in affect told 
to lease the ground and installations ‘required for defense purposes’ without 
any financial compensation.8 Furthermore, the German government paid all 
costs associated with re-building, maintaining, and establishing bases for the 
Allied Forces during this time as part of reparation transfers.9  
In addition to facilities in their own sector, the U.S. Armed Forces took 
over a number of strategic locations in the federal state of Rhineland-
Palatinate from the French forces.10 Also during this time, the United States 
established strategic positions in the former British areas of Bremerhaven-in 
support of the Northern city’s important port facilities and in North Rhine-
Westphalia in support of the nearby Netherlands Military Community.11
West Germany completed its evolution to a Western ally in 1955 by 
establishing itself as a sovereign democratic nation and by joining the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).12 Membership in NATO canceled out 
the previous basing agreement between West Germany and the Allied 
Forces; instead, the bases had to meet the terms of NATO statutes governing 
troop  deployments  in  a  Member  State.13  Since  that  moment,  the  United  
 
5 Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003,” The Heritage Foundation,  
27 October 2004; available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-
11.cfm; Internet; accessed 28 February 2005. 
6 Ibid. 







13 Ibid, 10-11. 
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States began paying all expenses to maintain, improve, or establish bases in 
West Germany; as compensation, West Germany agreed to lease the land to 
U.S. Forces for free.14
Once moved into their strategic position after World War II, both Cold 
War sides respected the status quo for almost 50 years. On October 3, 1990, 
Germany was reunified.15 The Cold War front-line protected by seven 
countries was eliminated. The international security system in Europe was 
dramatically changed. Also on that date, the new all-German national 
government became fully independent, allowing Germany the power to review 
regulations governing stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Presently, 
Germany remains interested in hosting NATO troop deployments indefinitely. 
In spite of the continued strength of the NATO alliance, the burden of 
supporting more than a million soldiers on German soil became unbearable-
not only for the United States, but also for the reunified German state. As a 
result, the U.S. has dramatically reduced their troop deployments in Germany. 
Consequently, between January 1990 and February 1995, the U.S. 
Department of Defense announced twenty rounds of overseas base 
closures.16 The operation of the 953 installations has been ended, reduced or 
placed on a standby status; eighteen of those rounds affected 636 installation 
sites in Germany.17 The majority of the U.S. installations involved in the 
redeploying process have been Army facilities (556 sites), while 80 sites 
belonged to the U.S. Air Force Bases.18 During this period, the U.S. Army 
abandoned some of the most powerful symbols of the Cold War, including 
Check Point Charlie, as well as the rest of its 42 Berlin facilities, all three 
Fulda border observation points and other holdings in that strategically 
important passage.19
 
14 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, 11. 
15 Ibid. 





                                                
 The level of U.S. Army personnel in Germany has been reduced from 
210,000 in 1989 to approximately 82,000 in 1995.20 In 2000, just 69,203 
American military personnel remained in Germany.21
The U.S. Army disbanded 40 percent of its Military Communities; in the 
meantime, no Military Community was able to avoid reductions.22 The U.S. Air 
Force cut more aggressively in the early rounds than did the Army. From 1990 
to 1994, the United States withdrew approximately 28,500 Air Force soldiers 
and civilians, marking a significant 60 percent reduction.23
 Today, in Germany, there are still a considerable number of U.S. 
troops. In 2003, according to the German Information Center, more than 
100,000 military personnel and their families were at home at U.S. bases on 
German soil.24 The Ramstein/Landstuhl/Kaiserslautern Military Community 
with 34,000 American residents, is the largest American community outside of 
the United States.25 Together with the Kaiserslautern, there are nine main 
American Military Communities in Germany. The others include the following: 
Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels (24,500 personnel and family), Heidelberg (16,000), 
Spangdahlem (12,000), Schweinfurt (12,000), Stuttgart (10,800), Wiesbaden 
(5,500), Coleman/Mannheim (5,000), Geilenkirchen (3,000).26 The large 
number of U.S. troops in Germany was not only part of a military plan, it was 
also an element of wider American policy towards Europe. 
 
20 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, 20. 
21 Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003.” 
22 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, 20. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
24 German Embassy Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany 
[database on line]; available from http://www.germany-
info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/bases/American-bases_in_Germany_fs.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 20 December 2004. 
25 German Embassy Washington D.C., Fact Sheet: American Bases in Germany. 
26 Ibid. 
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B. U.S. BASES IN GERMANY ACCORDING TO AMERICAN 
INTERESTS IN EUROPE 
For the majority of Western Europeans during and after World War II, 
America’s foreign policy and its culture were personified by the American 
army.27 It is impossible to consider the defense posture of American forces in 
Europe without analyzing their dominant position in Germany, which was split 
in half by post-1945 occupations of Soviets in the East and the other Allies in 
the West.  
In the beginning, the mission of the U.S. military was to secure and 
control their part of the country. To fulfill this task, they maintained a 
widespread system of installations in the sector. In many cases, the American 
troops commandeered former German bases for their own use. These bases 
were generally located near city centers and industrial facilities. Without any 
formal government to object, the United States simply assumed ownership of 
the installations and other facilities considered necessary.28
Because of the original 1945 occupation zone, approximately 94 
percent of U.S. civilian and military personnel were still located in the 
Southern and Southwestern German federal states of Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, Hesse and Rhineland-palatinate.29 Within that region, the 
United States divided its Army bases and personnel between two lines of 
defense.30 The first line was located out along Southern sections of the inner-
German front line, with its strategic center at the Fulda Gap.31 Further Army 
units were stationed in Southwestern Rhineland-Palatinate, westwards from 
the river Rhine, and in close proximity to the border with France and 
Luxembourg.32 Mainly, these bases created the Northern flank of the second 
line of defense and protected the six U.S. Air Bases (Bitburg, Hahn, 
 
27 Richard Pells, Not Like Us, 40. 
28 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, 10. 





                                                
Ramstein, Sembach, Spangdahlem and Zweibrücken), which were 
concentrated in the relatively small state of Rhineland-Palatinate.33
 U.S. bases in Germany were also the most important part of the 
American strategy towards Europe. Of all the cultural missions undertaken in 
Europe by the American government after World War II, none was bigger or 
more ambitious than the attempt to create within its own zone of occupation 
an entirely new Germany.34 Between 1945 and 1949 Germany was 
exhausted and in need of every conceivable form of assistance; the American 
army controlled the whole population and Washington could presumably 
accomplish whatever it wanted.35 It was a great opportunity for political 
reform, social engineering, and cultural transformation all of which would 
serve the interests both of America’s democratic ideals and its postwar foreign 
policy.36
 To convert the Germans in the American zone from beggars to 
partners, the United States had to help re-establish the economic and cultural 
infrastructure. In June 1947, at Harvard University, in one of the most famous 
inauguration speeches ever given, Secretary of State George Marshall 
announced America’s willingness to help Europe in postwar recovery.37 
Germany was the most important element of the American financial and 
recovery plan. 
 The attempt to restore West Germany according to American 
specifications, and to secure its loyalty in the predictable confrontation with 
the Soviet Union, was not just an experiment designed for one country. It was 
an element of a much grander strategy, increasingly called the Atlantic 
Community.38 According to President Dwight Eisenhower;  
Properly speaking the stationing of U.S. divisions in Europe had 
been at the outset an emergency measure not intended to last 
 
33 Keith B. Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Bases in 
Germany, 12. 
34 Richard Pells, Not Like Us, 41. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 53. 
38 Ibid. 
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indefinitely. Unhappily, however, the European nations have 
been slow in building up their military forces and have now come 
to expect our forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.39
 With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 
1949, the United States and Germany formally became military allies.40 It was 
the turning point for two previously antagonistic countries. For the first time, 
the United States had signed on to a permanent alliance that linked it to 
Europe’s defense. For Germany, participation in NATO signaled a new 
acceptance abroad and an important political legitimacy. The strong tie 
remained solid throughout the turbulent years of the Cold War. German 
leaders from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl remained determinedly pro-
American in their outlook.41
 When the Iron Curtain finally came down in the fall of 1989, the United 
States was Germany’s leading supporter in the drive for reunification.42 While 
European countries such as Britain, France, Italy, and Poland considered the 
unification of Germany as a potential threat, the administration of President 
George H.W. Bush considered united Germany as the anchor for post-Cold 
War Europe.43 The United States was the sole original World War II victor 
actively and consequently supporting its unification.44
 Today, America still has many interests in Europe. These include 
expanding democracy, keeping European markets open to American goods 
and ideas, preventing the domination of the continent by hostile powers and 
avoiding major wars.45 To ensure that these interests are protected, America 
will have to participate in creating the new expanded Europe, or risk losing 
 
39 Kim R. Holmes and Jay P. Kosminsky, eds., Reshaping Europe: Strategies for a Post-
Cold War Europe (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1990), 201. 
40 Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, “What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German 
Alliance,” The Heritage Foundation, 30 October 2002; available from 






45 Kim R. Holmes and Jay P. Kosminsky, eds., Reshaping Europe, 183. 
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Washington’s ability to influence events. Without U.S. bases in Germany, the 
American influence in the European continent would be less efficient. 
 According to Karsten D. Voigt, the Coordinator for German-American 
Relations: 
…Germany remains the largest U.S. stationing location in 
Europe. At the same time, the Americans will use their bases in 
Europe, especially in Germany, not to defend against enemies 
in Europe -for they no longer exist-but rather to have highly 
mobile units here. New units will come here which are intended 
for operations outside or on the periphery of Europe.46  
C. THE WAR IN IRAQ AND THE CRISIS WITHIN U.S.-GERMAN 
RELATIONS 
The policy of President George W. Bush in Iraq has been a litmus test 
in present U.S.-German relations. It was also the symbol of the new era and 
different political climate between two previously closely related countries. 
During the Cold War, Germany lived and grew stronger under the umbrella of 
American forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of the 
whole nation, Germany wanted to be an independent actor in the political 
arena.  
Since the very beginning, the German approach towards the war in Iraq 
was unequivocally pessimistic. Despite the fact that during the Cold War 
transatlantic partnership has been one of the basic trends of German foreign 
policy, Berlin has ruled out military participation in the Iraq war.47 Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder has stated indisputably that Germany will not participate 
in U.S-led military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power.48  
However, despite of the negative, anti-war German approach, on 
March 19, 2003, the invasion of Iraq began.49 Contrasting to broad Western-
Arab coalition during the first Gulf War, this time approximately 99 percent of 
 
46 German Embassy Washington D.C., German-U.S. Relations [database on line]; 
available from http://www.germany-
info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/bases/American-bases_in_Germany_fs.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 27 February 2005. 
47 Dr. Nile Gardiner and Helle Dale, “What Berlin Must Do to Repair the U.S.-German 
Alliance.” 
48 Ibid. 
49 Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire, The Near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: European Union Studies Association, 2004), 74. 
 15
                                                
the expeditionary force was American and British, plus one Danish submarine 
and two hundred Polish soldiers; critics referred to the alliance as the 
“coalition of the bought.”50  
Nevertheless, once again the U.S. military proved extraordinary 
efficient. Precision weapons worked as well as they had in Afghanistan 
American commandos got to the oilfields fast enough to prevent their being 
set ablaze en masse as in 1991. There was no nightmare of house-to-house 
bloody fighting. The worst-case scenarios did not happen. Even without 
significant involvement of American ground troops from the North Saddam 
Hussein was defeated in a swift, three-week march on Baghdad.51
However, according to George Kennan, “…Anyone who has studied 
history knows that you might start the war with certain thing in your mind, but 
you end up fighting for things never thought of before.” The preparation and 
the procession of the war against Iraq sparked things off within the NATO 
Alliance.52 The operation was planned without the cooperation of NATO 
bodies and with the participation of only Britain.53 More importantly, the war 
was conducted without the United Nations endorsement and despite negative 
opinion from the key transatlantic partners: Germany and France.  
America started the war in Iraq, and along the way, had fewer allies 
and more enemies. On the eve of the Iraq war, favorable opinion about the 
United States plunged from 63 percent in mid-2002 to 31 percent in France, 
from 61 percent to 25 percent in Germany, and from 70 percent to 34 percent 
in Italy.54 However, the U.S. administration still held that those who were not 
with the United States were against them, and blamed the transatlantic 
breach of 2003 exclusively on French insolence and German ingratitude.55  
The failure of creating a coalition with Europeans forced the United 
States to reevaluate their transatlantic alliance. U.S. Defense Secretary 
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Donald Rumsfeld dismissed Germany and France as the “old Europe” and 
praised the “new Europe,” which consisted of countries that backed the United 
States.56 In Washington, “old Europe,” with Germany as the main actor, was 
seen as incapable of mounting a major military operation. The overthrowing of 
Saddam Hussein, occupation of Iraq, and the challenges of postwar 
reconstruction provided a new context for the transatlantic ties as well as for 
U.S.–German relations. 
From the beginning, the Chancellor Schroeder cast doubt on the 
reliability of evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and 
observed that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein “may be overestimated” 
by President Bush’s senior advisers.57 Schroeder’s challenger during the 
elections, Edmund Stoiber, even said he would refuse to let the United States 
use Germany as its staging ground for any unilateral war on Iraq.58 In 
reference to Germany’s $9 billion contribution to fund the Gulf War, Schroeder 
informed, “the time of cheque book diplomacy is over once and for all.”59
German criticism of U.S. plans for Iraq sometimes descended into 
clearly anti-American polemic. According to Ludwig Stiegler, the Social 
Democrat’s parliamentary leader, President Bush acted like a Roman dictator, 
“as if he were Caesar Augustus and Germany were his province Germania.”60 
Stiegler also compared the U.S. Ambassador Daniel R. Coates, to Pyotr 
Abrassimov, the disliked Soviet Ambassador to East Germany prior to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.61  
In German press, anti-American opinions were even more 
straightforward. Schroeder’s former Justice Minister Herta Daeubler-Gmelin 
compared President Bush’s policy towards Iraq with that of Hitler’s strategy 
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before World War II.62 In the local German newspaper, Schwabisches 
Tagblatt stated “Bush wants to divert attention from his domestic problems. It 
is a classic tactic. It’s one that Hitler also used.”63 Former Defense Minister 
Rudolf Scharping accused President Bush of wishing to remove Saddam 
Hussein in order to placate “a powerful-perhaps overly powerful-Jewish 
lobby.”64
These statements sharpened the American reaction towards Germany. 
From the American point of view; Germany was rehabilitated and rebuilt with 
U.S. help, protected from the Soviet Union by U.S. willingness to fight a Third 
World War in its defense, and finally, unified thanks to American 
steadfastness when others doubted.65  
Today, the prevailing American feeling about Germany is one of 
disillusionment and disappointment.66 U.S. animosity towards France might 
be stronger, but disappointment with Germany may be more far-reaching. 
U.S.-German crises is by definition crises in the transatlantic alliance, which 
Americans have always seen Germany anchoring on the European side.67 
NATO has survived many Franco-American storms but never an open 
German break with the United States on something as significant as a 
decision to use force.68
In Washington, it was assumed that the fast U.S. military triumph in 
Iraq would show Europeans that they had been wrong to be so timorous 
about the war.69 In addition, even if they did not confess the error of their 
ways, Europeans would now have to adjust to the world as America had 
remade it.70 The proper way to deal with European malcontents, in the words 
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attributed to Condolezza Rice, was to forgive the Russians, ignore the 
Germans, and punish the French.71
 Recently, the sharp differences within transatlantic relations, most 
evident in German opposition to U.S. unilateralism, have receded. The 
Coordinator for German-American Relations, Karsten D. Voigt mentioned that: 
…Overall, German-American relations remain exceptionally 
close and very important; both in the military and diplomatic 
sphere, but are characterized by the fact that either Germans 
and Americans together or the Americans alone will now protect 
Europe from threats emanating from outside Europe.72
The Bush administration has adopted a multilateral perspective with the 
help of the UN and its NATO and EU allies. Nevertheless, the tensions 
between unilateral and multilateral attitudes evident in the crisis of 2002-03 
are still not fading. That crisis revealed a serious clash of values concerning 
the legitimate use of military force in world politics-a clash rooted in different 
political institutions and historical narratives on both sides of the Atlantic.73
The war in Iraq revealed, in the clearest manner imaginable, both what 
had changed and what remained constant within the transatlantic alliance.74 
The most important change, however, was America’s concept of international 
relations and foreign policy. The priority on transatlantic matters that 
characterized American foreign policy during the Cold War no longer exists. 
The American area of interest is transferring from the Cold War border in 
Germany into other trouble spots in the world, particularly in the Middle East 
and West Asia.  
D. CHALLENGES FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY 
The political split during the war in Iraq revealed different approaches 
towards the United States within European nations. Contradictory to the 
hesitance of Germany, Eastern Europe already started the competition for the  
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privilege of hosting U.S. military bases in its territory. For the majority of 
Eastern European countries, future military cooperation with the U.S. is the 
primary political objective. 
Redeploying and opening new bases is a serious and costly enterprise. 
However, despite of the significant cost involved, in Eastern Europe there are 
plenty of Soviet-era bases; and while most would require significant 
improvements, some countries are already modernizing their bases. For 
example, Romania and Bulgaria are currently upgrading bases in Constanza 
and Burgas under the terms of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).75 
Moreover, Bulgaria offers Black Sea access with its ports of Varna and 
Burgas, and air bases such as Dobritch in the Northeast and Kroumovo in the 
South.76 The Taszar air base in Hungary, which was used by U.S. forces to 
conduct operations in the Balkans, could be upgraded and adapted for 
American needs.77 The Czech Republic, as well as other countries, offers a 
variety of basing prospects. 
Of the many potential locations, Poland has several attractive 
opportunities for U.S. military bases in the future. Strong and consistent 
support from Warsaw for American policy during the Iraq crisis is an important 
indication of its desire to strengthen its strategic partnership with Washington. 
During the negotiating talks concerning access into the European Union, 
despite the different opinion of France and Germany, Polish government 
unambiguously supported American military plans towards Iraq. Warsaw not 
only publicly backed the U.S. intervention—a move that put it at odds with 
many West European members of NATO, but also sent a combat unit to 
Iraq.78 Moreover, the Polish government decided to send 2,500 soldiers into 
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Iraq after the war, and agreed to take responsibility for one of the three 
peacekeeping zones in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s defeat.79
Strong alliance with the U.S. is a significant part of the Polish national 
strategy. According to Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz: 
Poland understands the US intentions… particularly the right to 
self-defense against the threat that showed its apocalyptic 
countenance on September 11. The struggle for freedom and 
democracy of our people-but also of other nations-has long 
traditions in Polish political culture, so it is natural that we feel an 
affinity for the mission undertaken by our great Trans-Atlantic 
partner.80  
The political-military relations with the U.S. are an important part of the 
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland:  
Active and close political and military contacts with U.S., 
strengthened by cooperation in the framework of military action 
and stabilization operation in Iraq, are the part of significant 
achievement of Polish security policy.81  
U.S. government officials also noticed a reliable Polish military 
approach. According to Bob Hall, the Pentagon’s NATO liaison during the 
Clinton administration,
The Poles have got a very strong military tradition…One of the 
great values of having them in the alliance is they are forward-
leaning on a lot of these operations, while the Western countries 
are less so.82
According to RAND specialists, within the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, Poland’s military performance has been the best of these three 
NATO members.83 Poland provided significantly more political and military 
support to the campaign in Kosovo than did Hungary or the Czech Republic-
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even offering publicly to send combat troops.84 Poland has also been willing 
to send troops for peacekeeping missions not only to Europe and Iraq, but 
also to far areas such as Haiti and Afghanistan. 
Poland’s desire to maintain a close strategic partnership with the 
United States can further be seen in its decision to purchase the U.S. built  
F-16 instead of the British-Swedish Gripen or French Mirage.85 Thanks to the 
purchase of 48 multi-role F-16 airplanes, manufactured by the American 
corporation Lockheed Martin, offset has become an important issue in the 
Polish media.86 According to Polish law, every contract exceeding 5 million 
euros has to be compensated with investment in the Polish industry of a value 
at least equal to that of the concluded contract.87 Lockheed Martin has the 
next 10 years to meet its offset responsibilities.88 During the first three years, 
firms from the U.S. should become involved in projects estimated at $3 billion, 
in the following three years, $2 billion, and during the final four years, $1 
billion.89
Poland is also attractive to U.S. officials because of its military 
infrastructure modernization plans. In 2004, NATO invested 1.2 billion PLN 
(est. $0.4 billion) in Poland for infrastructure. 90 The total value of its 
investment program is 2.5 billion PLN (est. $0.75 billion).91 By joining NATO, 
Poland committed itself to adapting its armed forces and military infrastructure 
to the organization’s standards. This includes the redevelopment of air and 
naval bases as well as development an air defense system. In 2004, for the 
first time, NATO’s investment was significantly higher than Poland’s own 
contribution to its development in infrastructure.92  
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Modernization of Polish airfields, naval bases and command centers is 
rapidly progressing. It is necessary due to potential dangers that could require 
the deployment of NATO troops in Poland. The construction and 
modernization of Polish army bases, carried out by NATO, involves seven 
airfields, two seaports, five fuel depots, six radar stations, four air defense 
command points, and a naval vessel guidance center.93  
Starting in January 2004, and continuing throughout recent months, the 
Polish media has carried reports about the possibility of establishing U.S. 
military bases in Poland. From the Polish point of view, the military airfields in 
Powidz near Gniezno, Krzesin near Poznań, and Łask near Łόdź are being 
mentioned as the most probable locations for potential U.S. Army bases.94 
These airfields could host complete facilities needed for the stationing and 
exercises of the U.S. Army.  
It is also probable that the Polish government will propose that 
Americans could establish a permanent training center in Drawsko 
Pomorskie, which has been available for maneuvers for years and has been 
regularly used by NATO troops.95 Additionally, according to the Gazeta 
Wyborcza daily, Polish government suggested using some of their domestic 
Army bases as a new place for U.S. logistics or training purposes.96
Moreover, Warsaw already supported President Bush’s plans for 
missile defense and has indicated willingness to serve as a site for a missile 
defense system for Central Europe. According to the Gazeta Wyborcza daily, 
Washington has conducted top-secret talks with Warsaw about installing one 
or two missile defense radars in Poland.97  
Finally, the majority of Eastern European countries, “new Europe” 
according  to  U.S.  officials,  are  willing  to  host  U.S.  troops in their territory.  
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From the political and economical point of view, the pressure from Eastern 
European countries might be a serious challenge for the present location of 

















































                                                
III. THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES FOR 
TRANSFORMATION PRESENT U.S. BASE STRUCTURE IN 
GERMANY 
A. POLITICAL CONCERNS 
To be more consistent with the realities of today’s threats, the United 
States should redefine its current political alliances. Restructuring the current 
American base structure in Germany must advance political interest of both 
the U.S. and its allies. 
Generally, the further East one travels in Europe, the more pro-
American the governments become.98 All of these governments had displayed 
solidarity with the United States despite concerns that this support could 
jeopardize their entry into the European Union.99 Eastern Europeans recall 
very positively American efforts for those on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain 
during the Cold War. After being oppressed by Nazism and communism, they 
see American political, economical and military commitment as essential to 
long-term stability in the region. From the historical point of view, only the 
United States could be the guarantee of peace and stability in this part of 
Europe. Therefore, many European countries are still ready, willing and able 
to support the United States in its hour of need. The series of letters 
proclaiming support for the action of the United States in Iraq proved the 
existence of a strong pro-American front in Europe.100 In fact, all the Central 
European countries stayed with the U.S. against what they considered as a 
Franco-German attempt to rally the European Union against the Americans 
and split NATO.101  
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Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s opposition to an American-led war in 
Iraq could be the best example of present Western European foreign policy. In 
part, there is a matter of consistent European multilateral approach versus 
unilateral American attitude. Europe wants to strengthen the international 
institutions and maintain the peace by diplomatic means. On the other side of 
the Atlantic, international organizations are perceived as inefficient. For the 
United States, the best defense is a good offense, and will do it alone, if 
necessary. 
During the operation in Iraq, certain members of the German 
parliament even tried to limit American use of German airspace.102 If it had 
succeeded, it would have severely hampered U.S. operations. It was only by 
accident, however, that they very significantly threatened America’s ability to 
act decisively and quickly during the emergency hour. 
The political reaction of the Eastern European countries during the Iraq 
crises was different. According to U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, 
months ago, the Prime Minister of Estonia told President Bush that he did not 
need an explanation of the need to confront Iraq.103 Because the great 
democracies failed to act in the 1930s, his people, and the whole country, 
lived in slavery for 50 years.104 Many Eastern European countries would 
express the same opinion. Countries like Bulgaria and Romania opened their 
airspace unconditionally and offered use of their land and seaports to U.S. 
forces during the Afghanistan conflict.105  
Throughout the Iraq crisis, Europeans also appeared divided within the 
United Nations Security Council, with Germany siding with France (and 
Russia), and Spain and Bulgaria with Britain.106 This dramatic split was 
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followed by Poland’s decision to fight the Iraq war as the only other actual 
European “belligerent” country alongside the United Kingdom.107  
Poland went one step further in supporting the United States in 
comparison with other Eastern European states. During the war, Polish 
Special Forces secured a key oil platform in the Gulf.108 Once the war was 
over, a Polish contingent took direct military control of a limited region in 
South-Central Iraq, with some assistance from NATO’s SHAPE and financial 
support from Washington.109 With the exception of Poland, within the forty-
eight Iraq-coalition members in 2005, there are many Eastern European 
countries including: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.110
As U.S military relations with old-line NATO allies grow more remote 
and attenuated, the Pentagon is benefiting from closer ties with Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic.111 “It’s the Eastern European countries that 
are desperate to have a relationship with the United States,” said retired U.S. 
Army Gen. Wesley Clark, the former supreme allied commander in Europe.112 
“They understand how difficult it is for the [Western] Europeans to do 
anything. They know it is the Americans that make things happen. They trust 
us.”113
According to a controversial, yet significant, statement by the U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Germany and France do not represent 
Europe.114 “I think that’s old Europe,” Rumsfeld said, “If you look at the entire 
NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. And there are 
 
107 Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. “New Stimulus or 
Integration Backlash?” , 52. 
108 Condoleezza Rice, “Our Coalition.” 
109 Andreas Maurer, Kai-Olaf Lang and Eugene Whitlock, eds. “New Stimulus or 
Integration Backlash?” , 52. 
110 White House [database on-line], accessed 15 January 2005; available from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-4.html; Internet. 
111 Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Looks Eastward in New NATO.” 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Steven Komarrow, “Ex-Warsaw pact nations now key to U.S.”, USA Today, 3 
February 2003; available from: http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/835302/posts; Internet; 
accessed 15 January 2005. 
 28
                                                
a lot of new members.”115 According to the other American security analyst, 
Nile Gardiner, from the Heritage Foundation, “France and Germany are 
declining powers on the international stage with no real influence…I see the 
nations of Eastern and Central Europe following (Rumsfeld’s lead).”116  
From the one side, these kinds of statements are unjustified and 
expressed during moments of political tensions. From the other side, 
however, they revealed the present political climate between the U.S. and 
Germany. 
B. STRATEGIC FACTORS 
 The other important principle for the transformation of present U.S. 
base structure in Germany is advancing America’s strategic objectives. Those 
objectives include nurturing existing alliances and friendship cooperation, 
preventing a hostile power from dominating Europe or the Middle East, and 
ensuring access to regional natural resources.117 To fulfill this task, the United 
States should increase strategic flexibility and strengthen regional stability. 
 Military bases in the heart of Germany no longer can serve the 
strategic purpose they did during the Cold War. According to national security 
analysts, future conflicts will emerge around the Caucasus, Iraq, the Middle 
East, and North Africa.118 Therefore, redeploying bases from Germany to the 
closer geographical proximity to those regions would allow the U.S. to 
respond rapidly to potential crises. Moreover, the United States could 
guarantee long-term stability in those regions and would shift their own 
military forces closer to the strategically important areas. 
According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith: 
We have found that we’ve engaged in military operations over 
last dozen years or so in places where nobody anticipated 
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engaging in military operations…And it is clear that one of the 
most important phenomena in the world today is uncertainty.119  
Feith also explained that the U.S. military will focus not only within regions, 
but also across regions: “…the idea that we have forces, for example, in 
Europe that are going to fight in Europe or forces on the Korean peninsula 
that are dedicated to Korean contingencies, is no longer our thought.”120 U.S. 
forces must be positioned around the world in completely new regions, so 
they can respond to future events. According to Douglas J. Feith: 
We do not believe that we know where we might have to do 
military operations…We therefore cannot be confident that we 
are based where we’re going to fight. And for that reason, we 
need to have a force posture that allows for flexibility.121  
Restructuring and redeploying present U.S. base structure in Germany 
would increase American geographical flexibility. At this time, the United 
States is too dependent on a few countries. For example, U.S. troops that 
deployed to Iraq have to wait for permission from the Austrian government to 
cross its territory.122 Also, the political situation inside Turkey might force even 
a generally sympathetic regime in Ankara to resist America’s using Turkey as 
a jump-off point, as has happened over Iraq.123 Turkey’s hesitancy to give full 
cooperation to coalition forces had a harmful effect on U.S. military planning 
and conducting the war in Iraq. The result was that the attacking allied forces 
really had no significant strategic reserve or maneuver force during the 
conflict.124  
New basing facilities should be more independent and better prepared 
to conduct emerging missions, such as anti-terrorism, infrastructure protection 
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and when necessary, contraband interdiction.125 Moreover, new bases should 
accelerate the Pentagon’s ongoing transformation from stabile, industrial-age 
force into digital-age force. As demonstrated by the September 11 attacks that 
required a response in Afghanistan, it is very difficult to foresee where U.S. 
forces will be forced to fight next.126  
For that reason, present basing structure in Germany, dedicated to 
confront heavy, predicted forces from the East, is not sufficient. Flexible, 
smaller U.S. military bases in strategically important places in East Europe, 
maintained by domestic personnel, should be better prepared for future 
threats. 
C. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES 
The United States should re-examine its present military base structure 
in Germany for operational reasons as well. Over the past decade or so, the 
Pentagon has felt increasingly constrained by training restrictions placed on 
the U.S. forces by their European host.127 For example, training has become 
more difficult in Germany due to stringent environmental regulations. 
Germany has severely limited America’s ability to fly helicopters at night, 
conduct live-fire exercises, and conduct training maneuvers in heavy, tracked 
vehicles.128 Although these restrictions are understandable because of 
Germany’s dense population and politically powerful environmental 
movement, they have forced the Pentagon to look elsewhere to train.129
The effects of such limited training became clear during an operation in 
Kosovo, when U.S. Army attack helicopters based in Germany were sent to 
Albania.130 Two of the 23 helicopters crashed, killing two U.S. soldiers, before 
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the team ever entered the fight.131 After analyzing the crashes, the Pentagon 
discovered that training was suffering because Germany, no longer fearing a 
Soviet attack, refused to tolerate the noise and pollution caused by Apache 
pilot training.132
Bases in alternative, host countries with fewer environmental 
regulations could provide new training opportunities. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland offer a variety of terrains on which to train, from vast 
flatlands and swamps to the Baltic Sea and rugged mountains.133  
NATO countries have already been conducting military exercises in 
Eastern Europe since 1994.134 For example, in February 2002, U.S. 
European Command decided to move its largest training exercise from 
Germany to Poland because German regulations put too many restrictions on 
the exercise for them to be optimally effective.135 This training exercise, 
Victory Strike III, was the V Corp’s biggest annual exercise, lasting three 
weeks and involving 5,000 U.S. soldiers.136
These training opportunities not only help increase the readiness of 
U.S. forces, but also facilitate interoperability among allies.137 The issue of 
interoperability between American forces and those of its allies should be of 
great concern and the more NATO allies train together, the better they will 
cooperate during a real conflict.138 The war in Iraq proved that the success of 
any military coalition comes down to the ability of its members to work 
together. 
NATO members and Eastern European nations have already 
cooperated during the conflict. Eastern European countries and Russia 
worked under American command during missions in Bosnia in 1995, nearly 
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every Eastern European nation sends representatives to work with American 
National Guard units, and many of those same countries send top military 
officers to study in American military schools.139  
Most importantly, operational restructuring should help alleviate some 
of the manpower issues that currently hamper the force.140 Decreased 
support requirements will free more troops for combat missions, and creating 
a base infrastructure abroad that reflects current U.S. national security 
priorities will promote efficient use of available resources.141  
D. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
According to the CRS Report for Congress, the Department of Defense 
possessed, in aggregate, 24 percent excess installation capacity.142 It pointed 
out, however, that, “…only a comprehensive Base Realignment and Closure 
analysis can determine the exact nature and location of potential excess.” 143 
It then went on to explain that the Department of Defense would conduct a 
careful review of its existing infrastructure in the coming year, ensuring that all 
installations will be treated equally and evaluated on their continuing military 
value to the nation.144 U.S. military bases in Germany are the significant part 
of this excessive basing structure. 
Redeploying bases from Germany eastward seems to be prohibitively 
expensive. Nevertheless, by establishing military bases of the new type, with 
smaller, rotational personnel in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would not incur the 
same sort of costs that it takes to build bases for soldiers and their relatives in 
more expensive parts of Europe.145 The economical study of this project 
requires a feasible study authorized by Congress and the George W. Bush 
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Administration.146 This study should concentrate on economic considerations. 
However, while there are costs involved, the economic aspects should not 
prohibit such a move if it enhances overall American national security.147
The United States already maintains an extensive base network in 
Germany. About 57,000 soldiers and 74,000 family members are now 
stationed in Germany.148 Troops are stationed at these bases for periods of 
years rather than on a rotational basis like in the Balkans, where U.S. forces 
rotate in and out on six-month rotations.149 Consequently, the U.S. 
Department of Defense needs to provide support services for entire families of 
troops presently stationed in Germany. For example, in Germany, the U.S. 
maintains 78 schools to educate the children of its troops.150 Including the 
family housing areas, commissaries, schools and other support facilities, the 
U.S. Army serves as landlord to some 22,000 buildings and 239 installations 
across Europe.151
The spending necessary for the continuation of this policy is significant. 
Ramstein Air Base, the largest and strategically important U.S. base in 
Germany, costs about $1 billion annually, an amount equal to Germany’s 
yearly contribution toward the upkeep of U.S. bases.152 On average, the other 
43 bases cost about $240 million each, about the same as a single F/A-22 
fighter jet.153 Generally, base operations support is a significant line item in 
the Pentagon budget, accounting for a little over $18 billion in 2003.154
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Instead of introducing a base restructuring plan, the United States still 
invests billions of dollars in new facilities in Germany. The U.S. Army is 
scheduled to begin construction soon on a $692 million base in Grafenwoehr, 
Germany, for 3,500 soldiers and 5,000 dependents.155 According to national 
security analysts, for the same expenditure, many smaller bases could be 
built in other places, such as in Eastern Europe.156 As a parallel example of 
the cost involved, in Quatar, the United States recently built the world’s largest 
store of pre-positioned Army equipment for only $110 million.157  
From the one side, maintaining and modernizing the existing U.S. 
basing structure is justified. From the other side, however, investing precious 
resources into the old structure, unprepared to new threats, is questionable. 
Present American engagement into places like Afghanistan or Iraq, far away 
from existing permanent facilities could support this option. 
On March 23, 2004, as a part of the budget justification required by 
Congress each year, the Secretary of Defense submitted a detailed report on 
the need for a further BRAC round.158 He also certified that an additional 
round of closures and realignments would result in annual net savings for 
each of the military departments, beginning not later than in 2011.159
The result of redeploying bases from Germany and introducing 
rotational deployment strategy is a much smaller infrastructure and fewer 
support facilities would be required.160 As a result, the Pentagon could save 
significant resources by minimizing support infrastructure on U.S. bases in 
Germany. Savings from this project could be transferred into new, planned, 
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IV. RESTRUCTURING THE U.S. MILITARY BASES IN 
GERMANY 
A. U.S. BASES IN GERMANY ACCORDING TO BASE REALIGNMENT 
AND CLOSURE PROCESS 
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, there were 97 major 
base closures and 55 major realignments during previous base restructure 
and closure actions in 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995.161 Besides cutting 
unnecessary infrastructure, this Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
process resulted in a net savings of $16 billion through fiscal year 2001, and 
annually recurring savings of $6 billion beyond then.162 The next BRAC round 
in 2005 will affect military bases in the U.S., as well as the basing structure 
overseas. One of the most important elements of the next BRAC round will be 
the U.S. military bases in Germany. 
According to Raymond DuBois, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
installations and environment, “…there are (overseas) places where we have 
a concentration of troops basically as a legacy of the post-World War II 
situation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.”163 The Cold War “has gone 
away,” he asserted; therefore, there is no longer a need for having 70,000 
U.S. troops in Germany.164 The 2005 BRAC will reconfigure U.S. military 
infrastructure overseas to meet the realities of the 21st century. 
The United States would have never won the Cold War if it had been 
unable to establish a credible presence in Western Europe. However, 
American forces in Germany, as well as the rest of the U.S. overseas military 
structure, are not prepared to meet the coming challenges of the digital era 
and America’s European basing arrangements should reflect these objectives. 
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On August 16, 2004, the George W. Bush Administration announced a 
proposal to considerably modify the U.S. overseas basing structure.165 The 
proposal would establish new overseas operating sites, and transfer up to 
70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe 
and Asia to the United States.166 According to the Administration’s proposal, 
up to 40,000 European-based U.S. troops, mostly from the Army, would be 
relocating to the continental United States (CONUS).167 The Administration 
argues that present U.S. global basing arrangements are a product of World 
War II and the Korean War. A study by the Joint Chiefs in the late 1990s 
found that the United States has 20 percent to 25 percent more base capacity 
than is needed by the armed forces.168 This base structure is still sapping 
precious resources of the U.S. Department of Defense. 
With the end of the Cold War, these basing configurations need to be 
updated to guarantee that U.S. forces are optimally positioned to react to 
possible 21st century military threats. The issue for U.S. Congress is whether 
to approve, change, or reject the Bush Administration’s proposal. Decisions 
would also considerably affect U.S. military capabilities, Department of 
Defense funding requirements, and the upcoming 2005 round of the Base 
Realignment and Closure process.169
Implementing the Administration’s proposal would bring the most 
significant redeploying of U.S. military troops overseas in about 50 years.170 
Most of the 40,000 troops would come from the 1st Infantry Division and 1st 
Armored Division, which are currently based in Germany.171  
According to General B.B. Bell, a new Army Stryker brigade will be 
transferred to the Army’s training center at Grafenwoehr, Germany, where 
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new barracks and family housing were built.172 Army Stryker brigade will 
replace heavy divisions created to counterattack Soviet forces during the Cold 
War. The new brigade is equipped with Stryker armored vehicles, which are 
much lighter and quicker than the M1A1 Abrams tanks used by the divisions 
they will replace. 
According to the CRS Report for Congress, in implementing the BRAC 
2005 round, the Department of Defense must prepare a force structure plan 
based on an assessment of the probable threats to national security over a 
20-year period, beginning with 2005.173 The Secretary of Defense must also 
estimate the end-strength levels and the major military force units needed to 
meet such threats.174 Moreover, he is required to conduct a comprehensive 
inventory of military installations and establish criteria for selecting bases for 
closure or realignment. Finally, he must address a broad range of military, 
fiscal, and environmental aspects likely to affect closure and realignment 
decisions.  
The Administration’s project has received mixed reaction from 
Congress and outside observers. For example, Michael O’Hanlon, of the 
Brookings Institute, expressed some concerns about the proposal, stating that 
DoD consultations with the State Department, Congress, and U.S. allies have 
been delayed and insufficient, allowing misperceptions about the proposal to 
grow.175  
From the other side, Lawrence Korb, of the Center for American 
Progress, stated that developing new global arrangements should be part of a 
general process for developing a national security strategy.176 In most cases, 
he explained, it is less expansive to base troops overseas than in the United 
States, particularly when host countries like Germany guarantee some of the 
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costs involved, and that closing bases will not save money unless the troops 
serving overseas are demobilized.177  
Additionally, American soldiers serving overseas as a whole act as 
excellent ambassadors for the values that the U.S. is trying to promote around 
the world, and it is extremely important to ensure that closing bases be done 
in harmony with allies and host nations. According to German Foreign Office, 
from 1945, some 17 million Americans have served tours of duty in 
Germany.178 Many return repeatedly as tourists. For this reason, the influence 
and perceptions of American soldiers towards Germany could not be ignored. 
On September 23, 2004, at a hearing before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the 
proposed redeploying of 70,000 troops back to CONUS would be completed 
over a period of six to eight years.179  
Donald Rumsfeld wasted no time after the 2004 presidential election, in 
launching the next major review of U.S. military strategy and hardware. Two 
days after election, Rumsfeld started to work on the 2005 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, which military analysts believe could result in a major 
reordering of U.S. defense priorities.180 Moreover, the Secretary of Defense 
set the phase for a massive round of U.S. base closings, with a new 
commission to start meeting early in 2005. 
The election of the George W. Bush to a second term leaves him 
responsible for completing the restructuring of the U.S. military for the 21st 
century while fighting the war on terrorism and looking for a way to withdraw 
from Iraq. Redeploying American forces from Germany in the complicated 
political situation after the war in Iraq will be the most important challenge for 
the President.  
The decision must be implemented, and it will be essential to ensure 
that any restructuring of American forces in Germany will be not seen as the 
reaction to Chancellor Schroeder’s opposition to war with Iraq. While rifts 
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have emerged over the war, it will be important to confirm that the United 
States values its traditional alliances, especially with Germany, and that its 
realignment process will benefit all of Europe. 
The situation in Iraq is also very important to the next BRAC round and 
to the future of American presence in Germany. Donald Rumsfeld came into 
office vowing to convert the U.S. armed forces into a force better able to take 
21st century threats.181 However, he could not finish this process because of 
the complicated and tense situation in Iraq after the war. According to James 
Carafano from the Heritage Foundation, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has 
to maintain an order in post-war Iraq, and then he will be able to shift his focus 
back to the transformation and redeploying troops from Germany.182
B. THE IMPACT OF AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE GERMAN 
SOCIETY 
The United States no longer needs to protect Western Europe from the 
immediate threat of thousands of Soviet tanks from the East. Nevertheless, it 
still envisions Europe, and in particular Germany, as an important part of the 
new political landscape and an important factor for global security. 
Closure and realignment decisions will significantly change the present 
U.S. military structure in Germany and will be a key issue in the future 
relationship between the two countries. The next aspect for discussions 
between the two countries is the influence of American reorganization to the 
German society. 
The presence of the U.S. troops in Germany for more than half a 
century has left an enduring mark on the local society. It is visible in the world 
of sports and entertainment, business, culture, and politics. However, as 
America shifts its strategic priorities, the U.S. military is not interested in 
keeping complex basing structures in Germany anymore. 
Reducing or closing the operations at a military facility has an instant 
effect on the economy through reductions in spending and lost jobs. However, 
the economic pain of base closures is limited to the areas in which reductions 
actually happen. Though some communities with a high dependence on U.S. 
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defense spending have not suffered at all because of the drawdown, this 
process could still be considered as the real menace. 
According to the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the 
short-term consequences of U.S. withdrawal may be predicted and measured 
in three ways. First, more than 32,446 Germans have lost their jobs in U.S. 
bases since 1991 [1995 data].183 Second, the United States has returned 
more than 92,000 acres of property.184 To put it into perspective, this amount 
of land is almost the same size as the German federal state of Bremen, and is 
twice as large as the U.S. District of Columbia.185 Third, the loss of more than 
$3 billion in annual spending by the U.S. military in the German economy will 
adversely affect local retailers and contractors.186
Several indicators may be used to evaluate the impact of U.S. 
withdrawal on the German economy. In their report from 1995, BICC revealed 
that the withdrawal process has already led to the loss of more than 150,000 
authorized positions, including more than 35,000 German civilian positions, 
due to facility closures and reductions.187 The restructuring process has also 
affected many communities, where the U.S. retains a significant presence. 
The extreme case is the Kaiserslautern Military Community, where almost 
5,000 authorized positions were lost during the reorganization, even though 
none of its 18 individual facilities was completely closed.188 Today, with more 
than 30,000 American residents, Kaiserslautern is still the largest American 
community outside of the U.S.189
The city district and surrounding county of Kaiserslautern are especially 
vulnerable to any withdrawal of hosting U.S. installations because of an 
exceptional dependence on the economic activities of the Army and Air Force 
Bases. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from that area would have 
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caused serious dislocations and problems for the local market and 
contractors. While such a worst–case scenario for the local economy did not 
materialize, in the course of base reorganization several of the main 
installations were reduced, eliminating thousands of authorized positions 
assigned to German civilians.190
In addition to its direct employment effects, the drawdown has resulted 
in indirect employment effects, also severe to the local economy. BICC 
estimated that in total, during previous restructuring courses of action, 70,000 
German jobs have been lost due to the U.S. withdrawal. 191  
In terms of spending effects, the demand of the American military 
community for goods and services in Germany has fallen by approximately  
$3 billion since the beginning of the drawdown.192 This sum includes lost 
contracts spending, salaries of laid-off German civilians, and the loss of 
American military residents’ consumption in the German economy. 
The absolute figures of the local layoffs are not comprehensive 
indicators of the impact of U.S. military withdrawal on the local job market. 
The influence mostly depends of the structure of regional economy. In highly 
developed, urban areas, the labor market could provide enough job 
opportunities to absorb German workers displaced by the U.S. redeployment. 
For example, Mainz, a city in the highly industrialized and densely populated 
Rhein-Main area, suffered one of the largest layoffs and the U.S. withdrawal 
caused short-term economic problems. However, most of the laid-off workers 
either found new jobs or were compensated though a special joint American-
German benefits package.193
The completely different situation is in rural, underdeveloped areas 
without industry and other prospects than working in the large American 
military base. The German Counties hosting the Air Bases in Hahn and 
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Bitburg demonstrated the link between the U.S. withdrawal and an almost 
instantly rising unemployment rate.194  
In the case of the Hahn Air Base, German government prepared the 
successful plan of the conversion. Realizing that U.S. reductions would occur 
after the end of the Cold War, Rhineland Palatinate analyzed the effect of an 
American withdrawal from the various Air Bases within the state as early as 
1989.195 From all the U.S. Air Bases in Rhineland Palatinate located in rural, 
undeveloped areas, the state’s analysis showed that Hahn would be the 
easiest of the group to convert. In the months after the closure 
announcement, the state declared its intention to convert Hahn into a civilian 
airport. As the conversion effort began to gain momentum, Hahn Air Baset 
successfully attracted 11 new companies to its facilities and demonstrated the 
possibility of effective conversion.196  
A different situation was observed in Bitburg. The economy of the 
county had been closely linked with the Bitburg Air Base. When the Air Force 
closed the base in 1994, it removed the district’s chief employer.197 
Thousands of Americans left the area; a withdrawal felt painfully by their 
former German landlords. The lack of alternative job opportunities caused a 
temporarily, and sometimes lasting, dislocation of laid-off workers and 
contractors, who previously worked at the base.198 With the virtual 
deactivation of the neighboring Sembach Air Base, Donnersberg County 
faced a similar situation, despite of the fact that the county’s economy was far 
less dependent on the American troops.199
Local officials’ ability to replace those jobs by converting closed bases 
will depend on several important factors: the location, condition, and type of 
facility provided for closing. Nevertheless, human variables, such as the 
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attitude towards conversion, negotiating abilities, market familiarity, and even 
the creativity of local and state officials, is just as important.200
Locals are worried about the economic impact of an American 
restructuring, and consequently, a withdrawal. However, a nationwide poll 
showed 49 percent of Germans would welcome a further reduction of U.S. 
troops.201 A little more than one quarter said they would regret such a move, 
while 18 percent said they had no opinion.202 Foreign base closures are often 
viewed favorably in Germany. First, foreign bases have a tendency to employ 
foreigners, not Germans. Second, there is a high demand for development-
ready land in German urban centers, and most of the U.S. Army’s military 
communities are located near German city centers.203
However, the impact of troop withdrawals would hit some German 
communities hard. The Ramstein and Spangdahlem air bases, the largest 
U.S. military communities outside the U.S. are home to 40,000 American 
soldiers and relatives.204 Around 6,000 Germans are employed there.205 An 
economical study by the University of Trier concluded that the bases 
contributed 1.4 billion Euro to the local economy in 2001, supporting some 
27,000 full time jobs in a region with few other economic possibilities.206
For the local citizens, this decision will affect not only the economy, but 
also the whole society. “If the U.S. troops were to leave on short notice, it 
would be a catastrophe”, says Peter Grüssner, in charge of troop matters for 
Rhineland-Palatinate, the state in which bases are located.207  
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If U.S. troops are to depart, many fear that German authority in world 
affairs will go with them. After World War II, Germany had great geopolitical 
significance. However, after the collapse of communism and the expansion of 
the European Union, this strategic significance no longer exists. For many 
Germans, U.S. military bases were their first exposure to American culture 
from the rock ’n’ roll music to sports like basketball and baseball. “Every 
American soldier who was ever stationed here leaves with an impression of 
how we live our lives. And through the soldiers, we understand a little bit more 
about America,” says Wiesbaden treasurer Mueller.208
In the report prepared by the Bonn International Center for Conversion 
in 1995, we could find some future consequences of redeploying U.S. forces 
from Germany. Despite of the fact that the U.S. withdrawal’s effect on the 
German economy has been limited, the real loss of billions of dollars has 
seriously affected the communities most dependent on the U.S. military 
presence.  
According to BICC, larger cities may create sufficient job opportunities 
to absorb Germans laid off because of the U.S. withdrawal. However, smaller 
communities with a higher dependence on U.S. spending may require 
successful base transformation to replace the jobs lost on the American 
bases.209 The BICC report could help in predicting the future outcome of 
redeploying the American troops from Germany, and in preparation, the 
necessary arrangements. Moreover, the report would help in dealing with the 
consequences of withdrawal for the society in both countries. 
C. THE FUTURE MODEL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES IN EUROPE 
 In the post-Cold War period, when the U.S appeared to have no equal 
competitors, and even more in the post-9/11 world where the battlefield 
appears to have no boundaries, senior defense planners have had to assume 
that surprise is the norm rather than threat-based force.210  
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New American defense strategy requires agile, network-centric forces 
that can take action from forward positions, rapidly reinforce from other areas, 
and defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively.211 Speed will be crucial in future 
conflict. U.S. troops and their equipment must deploy to the trouble spot as 
quickly as possible. Defense officials have said a small number of troops in a 
hot spot can often quickly head off a problem before it escalates.212 “We are 
not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas; instead we are 
focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends,” 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Faith pointed out.213
 According to General James Jones, Commander of U.S. European 
Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the changes 
contemplated to the U.S. military posture in Europe will help strengthen the 
North Atlantic alliance and prepare the American military for the missions of 
the 21st century.214 The shifts will mean fewer soldiers in Europe, however 
those that remain will be more agile and more lethal. Expeditionary forces that 
will rotate in and out of the area will increase U.S. military potential remaining 
in the theater. The timetable for the changes will depend on the changes 
recommended by the U.S. Base Realignment and Closure Commission.215
After transferring from Germany, the U.S. military bases in Europe will 
be completely different. The new bases have to be ready to respond new, 
unpredictable threats, their location should reflect proximity to the future 
conflict’s areas, and their maintenance should be limited to basic operational 
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needs without the necessity of creating a “little America” abroad. New, smaller 
bases will also foster the mobility and strategic agility of America’s forces. 
If all goes as planned and everything about the reorganization of the 
forces in Europe would be done in consultation with allies, three types of U.S. 
bases in Europe will emerge. Main bases will be system hubs, such as 
Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Rota Naval Base, Spain, and facilities in 
Naples.216 The Administration would then establish new secondary and 
tertiary facilities called forward operating sites and cooperative security 
locations in Europe and around the world.217 In contrast to the main operating 
bases, which have permanently stationed troops and family dependents, 
forward operating sites and cooperative security locations will be maintained 
by a limited number of military staff.  
In the forward operating site there will be a small number of Americans 
at the base permanently, however, the base could host continued operations 
quickly. Forward operating site will be the base kept “warm” by local nationals, 
contract employees, or a small cadre of service members. Forward operating 
sites could host a brigade but not support families, and be near an airport or 
seaport. Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo is an example of such a base: “We can 
simply turn on the lights and operate relatively quickly,” Jones said.218
The third type of basing would be the cooperative security locations. 
This will be a bare bones base. A cooperative security location might have 
pre-positioned equipment or supplies, but no Americans permanently will be 
based there.219 European Command is working with the State Department to 
negotiate access to areas. Jones said the command is building a catalog of 
bases that he hopes will “dot the landscape”.220 Special operations forces, 
Marines, or light infantry would use these bases.  
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Forward operating sites and cooperative security locations would host 
rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These 
locations would provide contingency access and be a crucial point for regional 
access. These new secondary and tertiary facilities would supplement main 
operating bases and help to facilitate the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to 
various parts of the world. 
If the new bases are to be established, they should not be the 
sprawling complexes that dot the European landscape today. They should be 
smaller and more spartan.221 Troops are stationed at America’s European 
bases for periods of years rather then on a rotational basis as they are in the 
Balkans.222 The result is that the U.S. government needs to provide support 
services for the families of most of the troops permanently stationed in 
Europe. 
“I don’t think that we will build the same kind of base that we built in the 
20th century-complete with housing, schools, and hospitals-a mini-America in 
other countries,” Gen. Jones told reporters in Stuttgart in March 2003.223 
Jones cites forward operating site Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo as a new 
model: U.S. National Guard units are deployed there on six-month rotations, 
without dependents, which makes them more flexible and less costly.224 The 
changes “are not revolutionary. But evolutionary”, he said.225 The 
transformation timetable is not set, Jones said, but the “embryonic” process 
that will decide how the U.S. military will look overseas will be completed in 
years, not decades.226  
Heavy divisions currently stationed in Germany would be replaced with 
a Stryker brigade: lighter, smaller and easier to transport to the key regions. 
This kind of brigade, in the process of transformation and redeploying bases 
closer to the threat areas, would allow U.S. military to create more 
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expeditionary, agile, and lethal force. Moreover, U.S. military with lighter 
brigades would be more capable of employing operational maneuvers and 
precision effects capabilities to achieve victory. Jones said technological 
improvements now enable a company of infantry soldiers in the 21st century to 
do what a battalion of soldiers did in the 20th century, and headquarters 
elements do not need to be so large.227 Any new base structure would be 
defined by “light ability, mobility [and] sustainability”, he said.228
In light of the enlargement of the NATO alliance that is growing 
eastward, it is logical that the U.S. Armed Forces will more fully engage new 
allies in military exercises and operations to increase readiness and 
strengthen interoperability. The U.S. should apply the newest century 
technology, institutional reforms and operation concepts to develop past 
century European basing strategy. Expeditionary basing, with reduced 
infrastructure, is an example of the future, more flexible, effective and efficient 
operating forces. According to the U.S. European Command, expeditionary 
basing will be a confrontation of agile versus permanent, and will be the result 
of cooperation and hard work with allies in a new political landscape in 
Europe.229 NATO pushes eastward, and this should be the new destination 
for U.S. military bases in the future. 
American soldiers should also be in places from which they can deploy. 
For example, U.S. troops in Europe that deployed to Iraq ended up taking the 
long way around when Austria denied permission to cross its territory.230 “We 
believe it makes sense to work out arrangements with countries that are 
interested in the presence of the U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the 
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regions of the world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the 
future,” Donald Rumsfeld pointed out.231  
Gen. Jones said that as he visits each NATO country in the upcoming 
months, he would discuss the idea of creating U.S. bases in Europe that can 
deploy troops faster and will be easier to operate than the current 
configuration.232 “We have made some recommendations as to how we might 
proceed with regard to the types of presence that we might be able to 
implement in Eastern Europe,” he said; “these are very attractive to us.”233 
According to Gen. Jones, bases in the East would be expeditionary type 
bases, not the main operating ones.234  
Joint Chiefs Chairman, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, during the 
press conference in June 2004, said no final decision has been made 
regarding the basing of U.S. forces in Germany.235 “There are programming 
issues, there are budgeting issues, there are issues of where forces may go 
back in the United States,” Myers said.236 According to Gen. Myers: 
It is a very complex process, lots of moving parts…We want to 
make sure that the way we are postured in the future is where 
U.S. forces are wanted…We want to make sure of the usability 
of these forces in time of crisis-that we can use them where we 
need to use them.237  
According to the CRS Report for Congress (November 17, 2004), U.S. 
officials have reportedly held talks with Poland, Romania and Bulgaria to 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the new political situation in Europe, when the Cold War is no longer 
a threat, American base structure in Germany should be reconsidered. It will 
be a painful and serious decision for both sides of the Atlantic, but 
nevertheless, necessary in different political configuration.  
After NATO and European Union enlargement, the security issues in 
the European continent look differently than few years ago. Germany is 
encircled by both NATO and European Union member-states. For the United 
States, Germany is no longer the borderline between two hostile powers. 
Nowadays, the widespread U.S. base structure on German soil created to 
confront the large, predictable enemy from the East becomes a heavy burden 
for the Department of Defense. The necessity of maintaining the whole 
system of bases in Germany, together with housing facilities for thousands of 
U.S. soldiers and their families, is questionable in a new political environment. 
The tragedy of September 11 revealed that the present extensive U.S. 
basing structure all around the world is inefficient in the hour of need. The war 
on terrorism required the transfer of American troops from bases located in 
the heart of Germany into such unexpected places like Afghanistan or Iraq. 
For these reasons, U.S. base structure should be more flexible and more 
mobile. 
In 2004 and 2005 the United States has conducted military operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and simultaneously has invested millions of dollars in 
the preservation of extensive base networks overseas. The call for increasing 
the number of troops in Iraq coincided with the efforts of U.S. Department of 
Defense for decreasing the extensive military structure overseas. U.S. 
defense authorities realized that expenditures for the basing infrastructure in 
Europe were sapping precious resources that should be intended for military 
actions.  
Moreover, in many bases in Germany, there are thousands of inactive 
soldiers far from the battlefield. The redeployment of American troops from 
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basing facilities in the heart of Europe into the areas of present military 
operations should help in achieving the military and political aims during the 
war on terrorism. It should also facilitate U.S. military to achieve strategic 
effects without asking for support from the international community.  
The realignment of the present American military structure in Germany 
has to be closely connected with the process of transformation of the entire 
U.S. Armed Forces. The present American base system in Germany is a 
heritage of 20th century threats and has to be changed to meet upcoming, 
unpredictable challenges of 21st century. The Cold War military era, based on 
thousands of troops with tanks and heavy equipment, is finished. In the digital 
era, small units equipped with light vehicles and weapons that are easy to 
transport and deploy will dominate. 
In regard to political, strategic, operational and economical 
considerations, the realignment and closure process of the existing U.S. base 
structure in Germany is justified.  
From the political point of view, American-German relations are 
becoming more complicated. German government has different perceptions of 
international security and the role of United States in the world. Aggressive 
American policy is being criticized by German politicians and public opinion. 
U.S. military action in Iraq is seen in Berlin as unnecessary and 
troublemaking. The German government even tried to hamper preparations 
for war in Iraq, and it was the serious threat for the whole operation. For this 
reason, the United States should draw a political conclusion towards future 
relations with Germany.  
In regard to the strategic point of view, the area of American interests 
was changed from Germany into other parts of the world, like the Middle East, 
Central Asia and North Africa. Therefore, the relocation of the present base 
structure in Germany seems to be necessary. 
After analyzing the operational priorities, military training in Germany 
became more difficult because of rigorous environmental regulations. 
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However, in Eastern Europe there are plenty of interesting training facilities for 
American troops with much more liberal environmental regulations.  
From the economic point of view, pumping the billions of dollars into 
the existing wide military structure in Germany seems to be thriftless. After 
realignment and closing part of the existing military structure, future savings 
can be used for the construction of basing facilities in other parts of the world 
that are important to the United States,.  
In the process of transferring the American troops from Germany into 
other parts of the continent, U.S. defense analysts should consider new 
challenges in Eastern Europe. The new destinations should fulfill the high 
requirements for the U.S. military. In Eastern Europe, American forces could 
find the variety of terrains to train in, friendly democratic governments 
supporting U.S. policy, and already prepared and improved basing facilities. In 
this part of Europe, American soldiers will be also in closer geographical 
proximity to potential threats.  
It should also be part of the new American strategy in leading to closer 
cooperation with those European countries that already proved their reliability 
and expressed the will to tighten bilateral contacts with United States.  
The consistent support of Eastern European countries for the U.S. 
policy in Iraq, and in the meantime strong criticism from Germany and France 
was a political test for American policymakers. The stronger cooperation with 
countries of Eastern Europe could be the political counterbalance for 
American opponents on the international arena. The United States should 
take advantage of this phenomenon.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The United States military presence in Europe is still vital to promote 
American values and foreign policy. However, the future shape of American 
military structure in Europe will be designed to confront new, unpredictable 
threats, like terrorism or ethnical conflicts. That is the main reason for the 
adjustment of the present U.S. basing structure according to the aims of 
American foreign policy in the future.  
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Although future areas of operations are difficult to predict, there are still 
many potential sources of conflict in Europe and other places in the world. In 
Europe, the situation in Kosovo is still tense and turbulent. The fragile 
situation in the Middle East, with still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and Iran nuclear experiments, will demand the increasing presence of 
American soldiers. The hunger and political instability in North Africa would 
require peacekeeping actions on the large scale. Therefore, the American 
basing facilities in the future should reflect these realities. 
According to U.S. Department of Defense and military analysts, after 
realignment, future American bases in Europe will be completely different than 
the existing ones. Smaller and more agile, they will be operated by rotational 
U.S. military personnel without families. Light brigades stationed in these 
bases, equipped with the weapons and vehicles easy to transport, will be 
lighter but more lethal. During peacetime, new operational sites will be 
maintained by locals, while during emergency time, new bases will be quickly 
developed into fully functional places. The disposure of new bases in different 
parts of Europe, closer to potential areas of operation, will reduce response 
time and make easier transport and logistics for field units.  
It is almost certain that American military withdrawal will impact the 
German economy and society hard. The closing of several large bases with 
thousands of local workers and contractors is equivalent with higher 
unemployment scale in many German counties with limited job opportunities. 
The reduction of American spending and demand for goods would be the 
serious problem for local German communities, small business and local 
landlords.  
Additionally, the withdrawing of American Forces would mark the end 
of the certain era for the German society. U.S. bases, since the end of the 
World War II, were present on German soil and guaranteed the peace and 
stability for recovering the post-war state. During the Cold War, with the 
American military and support, Germany was the important political actor on 
the international arena. Nowadays, many Germans are afraid that with U.S. 
redeployment in the future, German importance in the world will weaken.  
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In the name of good and productive relations in the future, the United 
States should assure the German government that the drawdown is a part of 
the American strategy, and is not punishment for the German opposition 
during the war in Iraq. In addition, the U.S. government should prepare public 
relations action explaining the process of withdrawal and direct it strictly to 
German society. German citizens should be aware that this decision is 
necessary in the new political situation, and is part of the transformation 
process of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
To lessen any potentially negative impact of American redeployment to 
the German economy, successful plans of conversion should be prepared. 
This is a complicated and multilateral problem, and requires detailed and 
bilateral cooperation. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense 
should prepare appropriate plans for using the redeployed American troops in 
other places important for national security. 
Restructuring of the existing U.S. military structure in Germany was 
already officially announced by the highest U.S. officials as a part of the next 
round of the Base Realignment and Closure process. According to CRS 
Report for Congress from March 21, 2005, work of the closure and 
realignment Commission must be completed by April 15, 2006.239
The final decision is expected soon and should be preceded by a 
careful and detailed study prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense with 
consultation of the German government. It is possible to predict future 
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